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IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES

ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. AUS990891US1

In re Application of:

RABINDRANATH DUTTA ET AL.

Serial No. 09/535,581

Filed: 27 MARCH 2000

For: **DETECTING COPYRIGHT
VIOLATION VIA STREAMED
EXTRACTION AND SIGNATURE
ANALYSIS IN A METHOD, SYSTEM
AND PROGRAM**

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Examiner: **PIERRE EDDY ELISCA**

Group Art Unit: 3621

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GROUP 3600

APPEAL BRIEF

Hon. Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks
Washington, D.C. 20231

Sir:

This Brief is submitted in triplicate in support of the Appeal in the above-identified application.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
37 C.F.R. § 1.8(a)

I hereby certify that this correspondence is being deposited on the below date with the United States Postal Service with sufficient postage as first class mail in an envelope addressed to: Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Washington, D.C. 20231.

Date: 4-8-03

By:


Betty Kirk

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST

International Business Machines Corporation, the assignee of record as evidenced by the Assignment recorded at Frame 0551 of Reel 010714, is the real party in interest in the subject Appeal.

RELATED APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES

No appeals or interferences known to Appellant, Appellant's legal representative, or assignee will directly affect or be directly affected by or have a bearing on the Board's decision in the present Appeal.

STATUS OF THE CLAIMS

Claims 13 - 17 have been canceled. Claims 1-12 and 18-28 stand finally rejected by the Examiner as noted in the Final Office Action dated November 20, 2002. The rejections of Claims 1-12 and 18-28 are appealed.

STATUS OF AMENDMENTS

No amendment was proposed or entered subsequent to the Final Rejection dated November 20, 2002, and labeled Paper No. 7.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

As set forth at page 7, line 3 *et seq.* of the present specification, the present invention is directed to a method and system for detecting on-line material that is suspected of infringing a copyright of a user's original work. In order to avoid copying the suspected infringing material, and thus possibly violating the suspected infringing material's copyright, a first distillation signature, which is incapable of being used to reconstruct the suspected infringing material's possible copyright, is generated. A second distillation signature of the user's original work is then generated, and the first and second distillation signatures are compared. If the first distillation and second distillation match, then there is a likelihood, although not a certainty, that the suspected infringing material and the user's original work are the same. The works are not certain to be the same, since the signatures

generated are not direct encryptions, and are thus incapable of being used to reconstruct the materials.

To illustrate, consider a paragraph of text from a webpage that is suspected of containing material that is so similar to other text being used that there may be a copyright infringement. The suspected copyright infringing material may be located using key data for identifying passages of text, such as used by a search engine to locate key terms on websites on the Internet. The suspected copyright infringing material is downloaded in a stream (orderly data stream), which is then used to generate "a first electronic signature." In a preferred embodiment, this "first electronic signature" is generated through the use of a linear feedback shift register, as depicted in Figure 5 and described in the present specification. The stream of data is converted into a binary data stream (converted from a stream of bytes to a stream of bits), and run through the depicted shift register. The shift register uses a combination of latches and logic gates (depicted as OR gates) to create a unique 16-bit "first electronic signature" for the block of data. That is, after running the entire binary stream through the linear feedback shift register, the register will contain a non-exclusive 16-bit value that can (likely) only be generated by the binary stream resulting from a unique block of data, such as a paragraph of text. Note that the non-exclusive nature of the electronic signature is that different blocks of data may generate the same electronic signature, due to the inherent nature of distilling the data to a smaller data form than the original data. This electronic signature is then compared with a second electronic signature for a block of data (original copyright material) owned/used by the user of the present invention. If the two signatures match, then the two texts are possibly identical, indicating a copyright infringement. In a preferred embodiment, the two blocks of data (the suspected copyright infringing material that was downloaded and the user's own original copyright material) are then visually compared.

Alternatively, the paragraph or other defined block of text can be parsed into smaller pieces (data segments), and each smaller data segment is evaluated as above. This allows the user to identify similar or identical passages of text. If similar or identical passages are identified, in a preferred embodiment the two passages are then displayed on-screen for a visual examination by the

user. Thus, the user is able to ensure that a copyright infringement is not committed, either inadvertently (by the user) or intentionally (by another party), on all or part of a passage.

ISSUES

I. Are the Examiner's rejections of Claims 1-4, 7-10, 18-21 and 26 under 35 USC §103(a) as unpatentable over *Atkinson et al.*, U.S. Patent No. 5,739,996, in view of *Tsuria et al.*, U.S. Patent No. 6,466,670, and are the Examiner's rejections of Claims 27 and 28 under 35 USC §103(a) as unpatentable over *Atkinson et al.*, U.S. Patent No. 5,739,996, in view of *Tsuria et al.*, U.S. Patent No. 6,466,670 and further in view of *Ammar*, U.S. Patent No. 6,424,728, well-founded?

II. Are the Examiner's rejections of Claims 5-6, 11-12 and 22-23 under 35 USC §103(a) as unpatentable over *Atkinson et al.*, U.S. Patent No. 5,739,996, in view of *Tsuria et al.*, U.S. Patent No. 6,466,670 well founded?

III. Are the Examiner's rejections of Claim 24 under 35 USC §103(a) as unpatentable over *Atkinson et al.*, U.S. Patent No. 5,739,996, in view of *Tsuria et al.*, U.S. Patent No. 6,466,670 well founded?

IV. Are the Examiner's rejections of Claim 25 under 35 USC §103(a) as unpatentable over *Atkinson et al.*, U.S. Patent No. 5,739,996, in view of *Tsuria et al.*, U.S. Patent No. 6,466,670 well founded?

GROUPING OF THE CLAIMS

For purposes of this Appeal, Claims 1-4, 7-10, 18-21 and 26-28 stand or fall together as Group I, Claims 5-6, 11-12 and 22-23 stand or fall together as Group II, and Claim 24 stands or falls alone as Group III, and Claim 25 stands or falls alone as Group IV.

ARGUMENT

I. The Examiner's rejections of the claims in Group I should be reversed because the combination of references does not teach comparing electronic distillations of different data, wherein the electronic distillations are each incapable of reconstructing data by direct decipherment.

The Examiner has rejected Claims 1-4, 7-10, 18-21 and 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over *Atkinson et al.* (U.S. Patent No. 5,892,904 - "*Atkinson*") in view of *Tsuria et al.* (U.S. Patent No. 6,466,670). The Examiner has also rejected Claims 27 and 28 under 35 USC §103(a) as unpatentable over *Atkinson et al.*, U.S. Patent No. 5,739,996, in view of *Tsuria et al.*, U.S. Patent No. 6,466,670 and further in view of *Ammar*, U.S. Patent No. 6,424,728. These rejections are not well founded and should be reversed.

Atkinson teaches a method of data encryption, and specifically teaches a method of creating an electronic signature using a public/private key pair. The electronic signature ensures the authenticity of the document being sent, analogously to a written signature. Various methodologies are known in the art for creating a digital signature. In the passages cited by the Examiner in *Atkinson*, this digital signature is created using a private key known only to the sender and a public key available to anyone. The public key is typically part of a digital certificate issued by a certification authority (CA) or agency. Thus, the sender "signs" a document using his private key, which encrypts the signature. To decrypt the signature, the receiver of the document uses the sender's public key. *Atkinson* teaches a second layer of security by requiring the receiver to use a second public key (provided by the CA) to decrypt the sender's public key. (*Atkinson* col. 3, lines 13-40; col 6, line 34 to col. 8, line 29.)

Tsuria teaches a method of authorizing/preventing video downloading. Like *Atkinson*, *Tsuria* uses digital signatures associated with the video content to authorize the video's downloading (*Tsuria* col. 5, lines 45-46). A digital signature is "created and verified by cryptography...transforming messages into seemingly unintelligible forms and **back again**." (*Digital Signature Guidelines Tutorial*, <http://www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/dsg-tutorial.html>; copy attached in Appendix B).

Applicants submit that exemplary Claim 1 (and similarly Claims 7, 18 and 26 and the other claims in Group I) is not rendered unpatentable by *Atkinson* taken in combination with *Tsuria* taken because the cited prior art references do not teach or suggest each feature of Claim 1 as amended herein. For example, the combination of references does not teach or suggest:

- "receiving a selectable data stream of suspected copyright infringing material"
- "generating a first electronic signature" of the suspected copyright infringing material and a "second electronic signature for an original copyright material", wherein each electronic signature is a "distillation" "that is incapable of reconstructing said original copyright material by direct decipherment," and
- comparing the two electronic signatures, wherein a match of the signatures "indicates a likelihood" that the two materials are the same.

The electronic signature is a distillation generated according to the data segment (or original copyright material) itself, and is not a "digital signature" as described by *Atkinson* or *Tsuria*. The distillation cannot be used to reconstruct the data segment (original copyright material). That is, the electronic signature of the present invention is a unique abbreviated value generated by logic to generate a unique value that identifies the data segment. The data segment provides the data required to generate the specific value (electronic signature), but the specific value, being a distillation, is incapable of reconstructing the data segment. Thus, the present invention is not an encryption/decryption method and system as described by *Atkinson* or *Tsuria*, and the cited prior art does not teach or suggest the claimed features as presently claimed.

Likewise, *Atkinson* and *Tsuria* do not teach the feature of comparing electronic signatures for different data ("original copyright material" and "suspected copyright infringing material"), wherein a match of the signatures indicates that the materials are the same. *Atkinson's* "digital signal" is a single unit of data that is decrypted by a receiver to authenticate the identity of the sender, and *Tsuria's* content is a single video content.

Because the prior art relied upon by the Examiner teaches only encryption from which material is reconstructable, thus creating the potential for copyright violation that the present invention teaches how to avoid, the rejections of exemplary Claim 1 and the other claims of Group I should be reversed.

II. The Examiner's rejections of the claims in Group II should be reversed because the combination of references does not teach visually comparing electronic distillations of different data, wherein the electronic distillations are each incapable of reconstructing data by direct decipherment.

The Examiner has rejected Claims 5-6, 11-12 and 22-23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over *Atkinson et al.* (U.S. Patent No. 5,892,904 - "*Atkinson*") in view of *Tsuria et al.* (U.S. Patent No. 6,466,670). These rejections are not well founded and should be reversed.

The Examiner's rejection of exemplary Claim 2 of Group II should be reversed for reasons presented above under issue I. The rejection of exemplary Claim 2 (and similarly the other claims in Group II) should also be reversed because the Examiner's combination of *Atkinson* and *Tsuria* do not teach "visually examining" the "suspected copyright infringing material" if the first and second signatures match.

As claimed by the claims in Group II, when a suspected copyright infringing material is identified, it is displayed on-screen to the user, who then compares the suspected copyright infringing material with the user's own original copyright material. *Atkinson* does not teach or suggest such a visual comparison of data segments. Rather, *Atkinson* teaches the use of a "cryptographic digest or hash," which is well known to those skilled in the art as being a number generated by an encryption algorithm from a string of text. The "digest" is manipulated by the computer's cryptographic routine, and is never "visually examined."

Because the prior art relied upon by the Examiner does not teach visually examining decrypted material, the rejections of exemplary Claim 5 and the other claims of Group II should be reversed.

III. The Examiner's rejection of Claim 24 in Group III should be reversed because the combination of references teaches away from the use of a feedback shift register to generate a non-reconstructable electronic signature.

The Examiner has rejected Claim 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over *Atkinson et al.* (U.S. Patent No. 5,892,904 - "*Atkinson*") in view of *Tsuria et al.* (U.S. Patent No. 6,466,670). This rejection is not well founded and should be reversed.

The Examiner's rejection of Claim 24 of Group III should be reversed for reasons presented above under issue I. The rejection of exemplary Claim 24 should also be reversed because the Examiner's combination of *Atkinson* and *Tsuria* does not teach the use of a feedback shift register to generate a digital signature, specifically a distillation that is incapable of reconstructing material by direct decipherment.

Claim 24 claims the use of a feedback shift register to generate a distillation ("first electronic signature") of suspected copyright infringing material. *Atkinson* and *Tsuria* teach the generation of decipherable encryption. A feedback shift register cannot generate a decipherable encryption, since a feedback shift register overwrites data by feeding new data into the shift register. This process of overwriting makes decipherment impossible due to the information lost, and thus the prior art teaches away from the present invention as claimed in Claim 24.

Because the prior art relied upon by the Examiner teaches away from the use of a feedback shift register to generate a distillation of material, the rejection of Claim 24 in Group III should be reversed.

IV. The Examiner's rejection of Claim 25 in Group IV should be reversed because the combination of references does not teach the use of a shift register to generate a non-reconstructable electronic signature for each data segment in material.

The Examiner has rejected Claim 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over *Atkinson et al.* (U.S. Patent No. 5,892,904 - "*Atkinson*") in view of *Tsuria et al.* (U.S. Patent No. 6,466,670). This rejection is not well founded and should be reversed.

The Examiner's rejection of Claim 25 of Group IV should be reversed for reasons presented above under issue I. The rejection of exemplary Claim 25 should also be reversed because the Examiner's combination of *Atkinson* and *Tsuria* do not teach the use of a shift register to generate a digital signature, specifically a distillation that is incapable of reconstructing material by direct decipherment.

Claim 25 claims the use of a feedback shift register to generate a distillation ("first electronic signature") of suspected copyright infringing material. *Atkinson* and *Tsuria* teach the generation of decipherable encryption. The prior art cited utilizes well known encryption techniques, which utilize algorithms known in the art to scramble and unscramble data. Claim 25 does not utilize an algorithm to generate an encryption, but rather uses a shift register to generate a number that is generated by the data, but in a non-exclusive manner. That is, the shift register generates a number that may be the same for many distinct and different sets of data. Such a process is not taught by any of the prior art cited by the Examiner.


Because the prior art relied upon by the Examiner does not teach the use of a shift register to generate a distillation of material, the rejection of Claim 25 in Group IV should be reversed.

CONCLUSION

In view of the foregoing arguments, which demonstrate that the combination of cited references does not teach all of the limitations of the present invention, Appellants respectfully request the Board to reverse the rejection of each pending claim.

Please charge **IBM CORPORATION Deposit Account No. 09-0447** in the amount of \$320.00 for submission of a Brief in Support of Appeal. No additional fee is believed to be required; however, in the event an additional fee is required please charge that fee to **IBM CORPORATION Deposit Account No. 09-0447**.

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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

APPENDIX A

1 1. A method for detecting copyright violation, said method comprising:
2 receiving a selectable data stream of suspected copyright infringing material;
3 generating a first electronic signature for said data stream of said suspected copyright
4 infringing material, said first electronic signature being a distillation, of said data stream, that is
5 incapable of reconstructing said data stream by direct decipherment;
6 generating a second electronic signature for an original copyright material, said second
7 electronic signature being a distillation, of said original copyright material, that is incapable of
8 reconstructing said original copyright material by direct decipherment; and
9 comparing said first electronic signature with said second electronic signature, wherein a
10 match of said first electronic signature with said second electronic signature indicates a
11 likelihood that said suspected copyright infringing material and said original copyright material
12 are the same.

1 2. The method of Claim 1, further comprising:
2 receiving said data stream of suspected copyright infringing material from the Internet.

1 3. The method of Claim 1, further comprising:
2 parsing said data stream of suspected copyright infringing material into suspected
3 copyright infringing material data segments; and
4 generating a suspected copyright infringing material data segment electronic signature for
5 each said suspected copyright infringing material data segment, each said suspected copyright
6 infringing material data segment electronic signature being a distillation of a corresponding said
7 suspected copyright infringing material data segment.

1 4. The method of Claim 3, further comprising:
2 parsing said original copyright material into original copyright material data segments;
3 and

4 generating an original copyright material data segment electronic signature for each said
5 original copyright material data segment, each said original copyright material data segment
6 electronic signature being a distillation of a corresponding said original copyright material data
7 segment.

1 5. The method of Claim 1, further comprising:

2 determining that said first electronic signature and said second electronic signature are a
3 match; and

4 visually examining said suspected copyright infringing material having said first
5 electronic signature matching said second electronic signature of said original copyright data
6 material.

1 6. The method of Claim 4, further comprising:

2 determining that at least one of said suspected copyright infringing material data segment
3 electronic signatures matches at least one of said original copyright material data segment
4 electronic signatures; and

5 visually examining said suspected copyright infringing material data segment having said
6 suspected copyright infringing material data segment electronic signature matching said original
7 copyright material data segment electronic signature.

1 7. A system for detecting copyright violation, said system comprising:

2 receiving means for receiving a selectable data stream of suspected copyright infringing
3 material;

4 signature generation means for generating a first electronic of said suspected material and
5 a second electronic signature of an original copyright material, each said electronic signature
6 being a distillation of material incapable of reconstructing said suspected material or said original
7 copyright material by direct decipherment; and

8 comparator means for comparing said first electronic signature with said second
9 electronic signature, wherein a match of said first electronic signature with said second electronic

signature indicates a likelihood that said suspected copyright infringing material and said original copyright material are the same.

8. The system of Claim 7, further comprising:

means for receiving said data stream of suspected copyright infringing material from the Internet.

9. The system of Claim 7, further comprising:

parsing means for parsing said data stream of suspected copyright infringing material into suspected copyright infringing material data segments; and

means for generating a suspected copyright infringing material data segment electronic signature for each said suspected copyright infringing material data segment, each said suspected copyright infringing material data segment electronic signature being a distillation of a corresponding said suspected copyright infringing material data segment.

10. The system of Claim 9, further comprising:

parsing means for parsing said original copyright material into original copyright material data segments; and

means for generating an original copyright material data segment electronic signature for each said original copyright material data segment, each said original copyright material data segment electronic signature being a distillation of a corresponding said original copyright material data segment.

11. The system of Claim 7, further comprising:

means for determining that said first electronic signature and said second electronic signature are a match; and

means for visually displaying said suspected copyright infringing material having said first electronic signature matching said second electronic signature of said original copyright material.

1 12. The system of Claim 10, further comprising:

2 means for determining that at least one of said suspected copyright infringing material
3 data segment electronic signatures matches at least one of said original copyright material data
4 segment electronic signatures; and

5 means for visually examining said suspected copyright infringing material data segment
6 having said suspected copyright infringing material data segment electronic signature matching
7 said original copyright material data segment electronic signature.

13. (Cancelled)

14. (Cancelled)

15. (Cancelled)

16. (Cancelled)

17. (Cancelled)

1 18. A computer program product within a computer readable medium having instructions for
2 detecting copyright violation, said computer program product comprising:

3 instructions within said computer readable medium for receiving a selectable data stream
4 of suspected copyright infringing material;

5 instructions within said computer readable medium for generating a first electronic
6 signature for said data stream of said suspected copyright infringing material, said first electronic
7 signature being a distillation, of said data stream, that is incapable of reconstructing said data
8 stream by direct decipherment;

9 instructions within said computer readable medium for generating a second electronic
10 signature for an original copyright material, said second electronic signature being a distillation,

11 of said original copyright material, that is incapable of reconstructing said original copyright
12 material by direct decipherment; and

13 instructions within said computer readable medium for comparing said first electronic
14 signature with said second electronic signature, wherein a match of said first electronic signature
15 with said second electronic signature indicates a likelihood that said suspected copyright
16 infringing material and said original copyright material are the same.

1 19. The computer program product of Claim 18, further comprising:

2 instructions within said computer readable medium for receiving said data stream of
3 suspected copyright infringing material from the Internet.

1 20. The computer program product of Claim 18, further comprising:

2 instructions within said computer readable medium for parsing said data stream of
3 suspected copyright infringing material into suspected copyright infringing material data
4 segments; and

5 instructions within said computer readable medium for generating a suspected copyright
6 infringing material data segment electronic signature for each said suspected copyright infringing
7 material data segment, each said suspected copyright infringing material data segment electronic
8 signature being a distillation of a corresponding said suspected copyright infringing material data
9 segment.

1 21. The computer program product of Claim 20, further comprising:

2 instructions within said computer readable medium for parsing said original copyright
3 material into original copyright material data segments; and

4 instructions within said computer readable medium for generating an original copyright
5 material data segment electronic signature for each said original copyright material data segment,
6 each said original copyright material data segment electronic signature being a distillation of a
7 corresponding said original copyright material data segment.

1 22. The computer program product of Claim 18, further comprising:
2 instructions within said computer readable medium for determining that said first
3 electronic signature and said second electronic signature are a match, thus enabling a visual
4 examination of said suspected copyright infringing material.

1 23. The computer program product of Claim 21, further comprising:
2 instructions within said computer readable medium for determining that at least one of
3 said suspected copyright infringing material data segment electronic signature matches at least
4 one of said original copyright material data segment electronic signature.

1 24. The method of Claim 1, further comprising:
2 generating said first electronic signature of said suspected copyright infringing material
3 using a feedback shift register.

1 25. The system of claim 7, further comprising:
2 a shift register for generating said electronic signature for each said data segment of said
3 suspected material.

1 26. A system for detecting a copyright violation, said system comprising:
2 means for storing a first electronic signature for an original copyright material, said first
3 electronic signature being a distillation of said original copyright material;
4 means for identifying a suspected copyright infringing material that is suspected of being
5 the same as said original copyright material;
6 means for generating a second electronic signature for said suspected copyright infringing
7 material, said second electronic signature being a distillation, of said data stream, that is
8 incapable of reconstructing said data stream by direct decipherment; and
9 means for comparing said first electronic signature with said second electronic signature,
10 wherein a match of said first electronic signature and said second electronic signature indicates a

11 likelihood that said original copyright material and said suspected copyright infringing material
12 are the same, thus indicating a copyright violation.

1 27. The method of claim 5, wherein said visual examination is performed upon said matches
2 of said signatures exceeding a predetermined number of occurrences.

1 28. The system of claim 12, wherein said visual examination is performed upon said matches
2 of said signatures exceeding a predetermined number of occurrences.

APPENDIX B

DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES TUTORIAL

- **Affirmative act:** The affixing of the signature should be an affirmative act which serves the ceremonial and approval functions of a signature and establishes the sense of having legally consummated a transaction.
- **Efficiency:** Optimally, a signature and its creation and verification processes should provide the greatest possible assurance of both signer authenticity and document authenticity, with the least possible expenditure of resources.

Digital signature technology generally surpasses paper technology in all these attributes. <18> To understand why, one must first understand how digital signature technology works.

How Digital Signature Technology Works

Digital signatures are created and verified by cryptography, the branch of applied mathematics that concerns itself with transforming messages into seemingly unintelligible forms and back again. Digital signatures use what is known as "public key cryptography," which employs an algorithm using two different but mathematically related "keys;" one for creating a digital signature or transforming data into a seemingly unintelligible form, and another key for verifying a digital signature or returning the message to its original form. <19> Computer equipment and software utilizing two such keys are often collectively termed an "asymmetric cryptosystem."

The complementary keys of an asymmetric cryptosystem for digital signatures are arbitrarily termed the private key, which is known only to the signer <20> and used to create the digital signature, and the public key, which is ordinarily more widely known and is used by a relying party to verify the digital signature. If many people need to verify the signer's digital signatures, the public key must be available or distributed to all of them, perhaps by publication in an on-line repository or directory where it is easily accessible. Although the keys <21> of the pair are mathematically related, if the asymmetric cryptosystem has been designed and implemented securely <22> it is "computationally infeasible <23> to derive the private key from knowledge of the public key. Thus, although many people may know the public key of a given signer and use it to verify that signer's signatures, they cannot discover that signer's private key and use it to forge digital signatures. This is sometimes referred to as the principle of "irreversibility."

Another fundamental process, termed a "hash function," is used in both creating and verifying a digital signature. A hash function is an algorithm which creates a digital representation or "fingerprint" in the form of a "hash value" or "hash result" of a standard length which is usually much smaller than the message but nevertheless substantially unique to it. <24> Any change to the message invariably produces a different hash result when the same hash function is used. In the case of a secure hash function, sometimes termed a "one-way hash function," it is computationally infeasible <25> to derive the original message from knowledge of its hash value. Hash functions therefore enable the software for creating digital signatures to operate on smaller and predictable amounts of data, while still providing robust evidentiary correlation to the original message content, thereby efficiently providing assurance that there has been no modification of the message since it was digitally signed.

Thus, use of digital signatures usually involves two processes, one performed by the signer and the other by the receiver of the digital signature:

- **Digital signature creation** uses a hash result derived from and unique to both the signed message and a given private key. For the hash result to be secure, there must be only a negligible possibility that the same digital signature could be created by the combination of any other message or private key.
- **Digital signature verification** is the process of checking the digital signature by reference to the original message and a given public key, thereby determining whether the digital signature was created for that same message using the private key that corresponds to the referenced public key.

To sign a document or any other item of information, the signer first delimits precisely

the borders of what is to be signed. The delimited information to be signed is termed the "message" in these Guidelines. Then a hash function in the signer's software computes a hash result unique (for all practical purposes) to the message. The signer's software then transforms the hash result into a digital signature using the signer's private key. <26> The resulting digital signature is thus unique to both the message and the private key used to create it.

Typically, a digital signature (a digitally signed hash result of the message) is attached to its message and stored or transmitted with its message. However, it may also be sent or stored as a separate data element, so long as it maintains a reliable association with its message. Since a digital signature is unique to its message, it is useless if wholly disassociated from its message.

Verification of a digital signature is accomplished by computing a new hash result of the original message by means of the same hash function used to create the digital signature. Then, using the public key and the new hash result, the verifier checks: (1) whether the digital signature was created using the corresponding private key; and (2) whether the newly computed hash result matches the original hash result which was transformed into the digital signature during the signing process. The verification software will confirm the digital signature as "verified" if: (1) the signer's private key was used to digitally sign the message, which is known to be the case if the signer's public key was used to verify the signature because the signer's public key will verify only a digital signature created with the signer's private key; <27> and (2) the message was unaltered, which is known to be the case if the hash result computed by the verifier is identical to the hash result extracted from the digital signature during the verification process.

Various asymmetric cryptosystems create and verify digital signatures using different algorithms and procedures, but share this overall operational pattern.

The processes of creating a digital signature and verifying it accomplish the essential effects desired of a signature for many legal purposes:

- **Signer authentication:** If a public and private key pair is associated with an identified signer, the digital signature attributes the message to the signer. The digital signature cannot be forged, unless the signer loses control of the private key (a "compromise" of the private key), such as by divulging it or losing the media or device in which it is contained.
- **Message authentication:** The digital signature also identifies the signed message, typically with far greater certainty and precision than paper signatures. Verification reveals any tampering, since the comparison of the hash results (one made at signing and the other made at verifying) shows whether the message is the same as when signed.
- **Affirmative act:** Creating a digital signature requires the signer to use the signer's private key. This act can perform the "ceremonial" function of alerting the signer to the fact that the signer is consummating a transaction with legal consequences. <28>
- **Efficiency:** The processes of creating and verifying a digital signature provide a high level of assurance that the digital signature is genuinely the signer's. As with the case of modern electronic data interchange ("EDI") the creation and verification processes are capable of complete automation (sometimes referred to as "machinable"), with human interaction required on an exception basis only. Compared to paper methods such as checking specimen signature cards -- methods so tedious and labor-intensive that they are rarely actually used in practice -- digital signatures yield a high degree of assurance without adding greatly to the resources required for processing.

The processes used for digital signatures have undergone thorough technological peer review for over a decade. Digital signatures have been accepted in several national and international standards developed in cooperation with and accepted by many corporations, banks, and government agencies. <29> The likelihood of malfunction or a security problem in a digital signature cryptosystem designed and implemented as

prescribed in the industry standards is extremely remote, <30> and is far less than the risk of undetected forgery or alteration on paper or of using other less secure electronic signature techniques.

Public Key Certificates

To verify a digital signature, the verifier must have access to the signer's public key and have assurance that it corresponds to the signer's private key. However, a public and private key pair has no intrinsic association with any person; it is simply a pair of numbers. Some convincing strategy is necessary to reliably associate a particular person or entity to the key pair.

In a transaction involving only two parties, each party can simply communicate (by a relatively secure "out-of-band" channel such as a courier or a secure voice telephone) the public key of the key pair each party will use. Such an identification strategy is no small task, especially when the parties are geographically distant from each other, normally conduct communication over a convenient but insecure channel such as the Internet, are not natural persons but rather corporations or similar artificial entities, and act through agents whose authority must be ascertained. As electronic commerce increasingly moves from a bilateral setting to the many-on-many architecture of the World Wide Web on the Internet, where significant transactions will occur among strangers who have no prior contractual relationship and will never deal with each other again, the problem of authentication/nonrepudiation becomes not merely one of efficiency, but also of reliability. An open system of communication such as the Internet needs a system of identity authentication to handle this scenario.

To that end, a prospective signer might issue a public statement, such as: "Signatures verifiable by the following public key are mine." However, others doing business with the signer may for good reason be unwilling to accept the statement, especially where there is no prior contract establishing the legal effect of that published statement with certainty. A party relying upon such an unsupported published statement in an open system would run a great risk of trusting a phantom or an imposter, or of attempting to disprove a false denial of a digital signature ("nonrepudiation") if a transaction should turn out to prove disadvantageous for the purported signer.

The solution to these problems is the use of one or more trusted third parties to associate an identified signer with a specific public key. <31> That trusted third party is referred to as a "certification authority" in most technical standards and in these Guidelines.

To associate a key pair with a prospective signer, a certification authority issues a certificate, an electronic record which lists a public key as the "subject" of the certificate, and confirms that the prospective signer identified in the certificate holds the corresponding private key. The prospective signer is termed the "subscriber. <32> A certificate's principal function is to bind a key pair with a particular subscriber. A "recipient" of the certificate desiring to rely upon a digital signature created by the subscriber named in the certificate (whereupon the recipient becomes a "relying party") can use the public key listed in the certificate to verify that the digital signature was created with the corresponding corresponding private key. <33> If such verification is successful, this chain of reasoning provides assurance that the corresponding private key is held by the subscriber named in the certificate, and that the digital signature was created by that particular subscriber.

To assure both message and identity authenticity of the certificate, the certification authority digitally signs it. The issuing certification authority's digital signature on the certificate can be verified by using the public key of the certification authority listed in another certificate by another certificate authority (which may but need not be on a higher level in a hierarchy) <34>, and that other certificate can in turn be authenticated by the public key listed in yet another certificate, and so on, until the person relying on the digital signature is adequately assured of its genuineness. In each case, the issuing certification authority must digitally sign its own certificate during the operational period of the other certificate used to verify the certification authority's digital signature.

A digital signature, whether created by a subscriber to authenticate a message or by a certification authority to authenticate its certificate (in effect a specialized message) should be reliably time-stamped to allow the verifier to determine reliably whether the digital signature was created during the "operational period" stated in the certificate, which is a condition upon verifiability of a digital signature under these Guidelines. <35>

To make a public key and its identification with a specific subscriber readily available for use in verification, the certificate may be published in a repository or made available by other means. Repositories are on-line databases of certificates and other information available for retrieval and use in verifying digital signatures. Retrieval can be accomplished automatically by having the verification program directly inquire of the repository to obtain certificates as needed.

Once issued, a certificate may prove to be unreliable, such as in situations where the subscriber misrepresents his identity to the certification authority. In other situations, a certificate may be reliable enough when issued but come to be unreliable sometime thereafter. If the subscriber loses control of the private key ("compromise" of the private key), the certificate has become unreliable, and the certification authority (either with or without the subscriber's request depending on the circumstances) may suspend (temporarily invalidate) or revoke (permanently invalidate) the certificate. Immediately upon suspending or revoking a certificate, the certification authority must publish notice of the revocation or suspension or notify persons who inquire or who are known to have received a digital signature verifiable by reference to the unreliable certificate.

Challenges and Opportunities

The prospect of fully implementing digital signatures in general commerce presents both benefits and costs. The costs consist mainly of:

- **Institutional overhead:** The cost of establishing and utilizing certification authorities, repositories, and other important services, as well as assuring quality in the performance of their functions.
- **Subscriber and Relying Party Costs:** A digital signer will require software, and will probably have to pay a certification authority some price to issue a certificate. Hardware to secure the subscriber's private key may also be advisable. Persons relying on digital signatures will incur expenses for verification software and perhaps for access to certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRL) in a repository.

On the plus side, the principal advantage to be gained is more reliable authentication of messages. Digital signatures, if properly implemented and utilized offer promising solutions to the problems of:

- **Imposters**, by minimizing the risk of dealing with imposters or persons who attempt to escape responsibility by claiming to have been impersonated;
- **Message integrity**, by minimizing the risk of undetected message tampering and forgery, and of false claims that a message was altered after it was sent;
- **Formal legal requirements**, by strengthening the view that legal requirements of form, such as writing, signature, and an original document, are satisfied, since digital signatures are functionally on a par with, or superior to paper forms; and
- **Open systems**, by retaining a high degree of information security, even for information sent over open, insecure, but inexpensive and widely used channels.

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Digital Signature Guidelines



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Digital Signature Guidelines Tutorial

Digital Signature Guidelines Press Release

Tutorial

In today's commercial environment, establishing a framework for the authentication <1> of computer-based information requires a familiarity with concepts and professional skills from both the legal and computer security fields. Combining these two disciplines is not an easy task. Concepts from the information security field often correspond only loosely to concepts from the legal field, even in situations where the terminology is similar. For example, from the information security point of view, "digital signature" means the result of applying to specific information certain specific technical processes described below. The historical legal concept of "signature" is broader. It recognizes any mark made with the intention of authenticating the marked document. <2> In a digital setting, today's broad legal concept of "signature" may well include markings as diverse as digitized images of paper signatures, typed notations such as "/s/ John Smith," or even addressing notations, such as electronic mail origination headers.

From an information security viewpoint, these simple "electronic signatures" are distinct from the "digital signatures" described in this tutorial and in the technical literature, although "digital signature" is sometimes used to mean any form of computer-based signature. These Guidelines use "digital signature" only as it is used in information security terminology, as meaning the result of applying the technical processes described in this tutorial.

To explain the value of digital signatures in legal applications, this tutorial begins with an overview of the legal significance of signatures. It then sets forth the basics of digital signature technology, and examines how, with some legal and institutional infrastructure, digital signature technology can be applied as a robust computer-based alternative to traditional signatures.

Signatures and the Law

A signature is not part of the substance of a transaction, but rather of its representation or form. Signing writings serve the following general purposes: <3>

- **Evidence:** A signature authenticates a writing by identifying the signer with the signed document. When the signer makes a mark in a distinctive manner, the writing becomes attributable to the signer.<4>
- **Ceremony:** The act of signing a document calls to the signer's attention the legal significance of the signer's act, and thereby helps prevent "inconsiderate engagements."<5>
- **Approval:** In certain contexts defined by law or custom, a signature expresses the signer's approval or authorization of the writing, or the signer's intention that it have legal effect.<6>
- **Efficiency and logistics:** A signature on a written document often imparts a sense of clarity and finality to the transaction and may lessen the subsequent need to inquire beyond the face of a document.<7> Negotiable instruments, for example, rely upon formal requirements, including a signature, for their ability to change hands with ease, rapidity, and minimal interruption.<8>

The formal requirements for legal transactions, including the need for signatures, vary in different legal systems, and also vary with the passage of time. There is also variance in the legal consequences of failure to cast the transaction in a required form. The statute of frauds of the common law tradition, for example, does not render a transaction invalid for lack of a "writing signed by the party to be charged," but rather makes it unenforceable in court,<9> a distinction which has caused the practical application of the statute to be greatly limited in case law.

During this century, most legal systems have reduced formal requirements,<10> or at least have minimized the consequences of failure to satisfy formal requirements. Nevertheless, sound practice still calls for transactions to be formalized in a manner which assures the parties of their validity and enforceability.<11> In current practice, formalization usually involves documenting the transaction on paper and signing or authenticating the paper. Traditional methods, however, are undergoing fundamental change. Documents continue to be written on paper, but sometimes merely to satisfy the need for a legally recognized form. In many instances, the information exchanged to effect a transaction never takes paper form. Computer-based information can also be utilized differently than its paper counterpart. For example, computers can "read" digital information and transform the information or take programmable actions based on the information. Information stored as bits rather than as atoms of ink and paper can travel near the speed of light, may be duplicated without limit and with insignificant cost.

Although the basic nature of transactions has not changed, the law has only begun to adapt to advances in technology. The legal and business communities must develop rules and practices which use new technology to achieve and surpass the effects historically expected from paper forms.

To achieve the basic purposes of signatures outlined above, a signature must have the following attributes:<12>

- **Signer authentication:** A signature should indicate who signed a document, message or record,<13> and should be difficult for another person to produce without authorization.
- **Document authentication:** <14> A signature should identify what is signed, <15> making it impracticable to falsify or alter either the signed matter or the signature without detection.

Signer authentication and document authentication are tools used to exclude impersonators and forgers and are essential ingredients of what is often called a "nonrepudiation service" in the terminology of the information security profession. A nonrepudiation service provides assurance of the origin or delivery of data in order to protect the sender against false denial by the recipient that the data has been received, or to protect the recipient against false denial by the sender that the data has been sent. <16> Thus, a nonrepudiation service provides evidence to prevent a person from unilaterally modifying or terminating legal obligations arising out of a transaction effected by computer-based means. <17>